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ABSTRACT
This study addresses the relationship between micro and macro level adaptation processes. We propose
that the top manager acts as a perceptual filter that links organizational decisions to the firm’s
performance in its environment. 
The study illuminates a chain of causality by which managerial intervention is effectuated. The basic
proposition is that organizational decision makers observe the organization’s performance, adjust their
behavior in response to changed beliefs, and subsequently change the organization’s routines.
Theoretically, the paper builds upon and extends prior work in the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert
and March, 1963; March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1981, 1993).
Two samples of medium-sized manufacturing and service firms are analyzed. The empirical results point
towards important contextual differences between manufacturing and service firms. We find that
managerial control behavior changes in response to organizational performance, and that this leads to
changes in organizational formalization. 
In manufacturing firms we found a negative relationship between managerial control and past financial
performance and the opposite relationship for service firms. The presence of financial slack therefore
influences managerial perceptions differently in manufacturing firms.
In service firms, as managerial control increases, the means for achieving control of others’ behavior also
increases. Increased managerial control is achieved through increased rule orientation, complemented
by increased goal orientation.  Both provide increased efficiency in routine situations. In manufacturing
firms, goal orientation was not related to rule orientation, just as the effect was not associated to financial
performance. At least for some firms, a high degree of formalization is likely to hinder adaptation, and
many firms are likely to substitute exploitation strategies for exploration strategies.
The paper concludes that in the process of changing organizational routines, top managers perform a
critical link between information about organizational performance and action. The sigificance managers
attach to performance information is clearly context dependent. 
1 We employ the word “prediction” in an unusual sense, namely to indicate an implicit rather
than calculated prediction. In this sense, prediction implies choice rather than deliberation.
We view choice differently than calculated decision making, where organizational (and
individual) choice is defined as the process of “...[S]orting out options, whether conscious
or non-conscious (Tallman and Gray, 1990: 423).”
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DYNAMICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINE CHANGE:
AN ANALYSIS OF DANISH MEDIUM-SIZED FIRMS
Managerial and organizational choice is often perceived as emanating from routinized behavior (Cyert
and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Organizations adopt elaborate structures and
communication channels in order to cope with the complexity of their environments (Deutsch, 1952),
and moreover, such structures embody the organization’s prediction about the problems it needs to
solve1.
As organizational structures embody routinized solutions to organizational problems, a key question
becomes how routines change. At one end of the spectrum, environmental selection processes, such
as competition between firms, influence organizational adaptation by favoring organizational forms with
higher fitness levels (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 1989). At the opposite end of the spectrum,
managerial preferences and behavior exert influence on organizational adaptation seen from the
perspective of the individual enterprise (Andrews, 1971; Child, 1972).
In this paper, we relate macro-level selection processes and micro-level selection processes.
Organizational routines are changed  in response to changes in the environmental conditions that firms
face. These changes are realized by organizational decision makers after evaluating the organization’s
5performance. Therefore, the personal values and preferences held by key organizational decision makers
act as a perceptual filter through which information about organizational performance is interpreted and
transformed into organizational action (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick and Brandon, 1988).
The top manager provides the linking mechanism between organizational action and performance as he
is endowed with sufficient power to affect organizational action, and, moreover, functions as a
perceptual filter that links strategic organizational decisions to the firm’s performance in its environment.
Thus our basic proposition is that organizational decision makers observe the organization’s
performance, adjust their behavior in response to changed beliefs, and subsequently change the
organization’s routines. Theoretically, the paper builds upon and extends prior work in the behavioral
theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; March, 1991; Levinthal and
March, 1981, 1993).
We test the hypotheses on two samples of medium-sized manufacturing and service firms using path
analysis. We obtain estimates for both samples, and compare the two types of firms. Our empirical
results provide support for all of our hypotheses in the case of service firms, and suggest that in routine
situations, organizational adaptation is incremental and path dependent. The results are different in the
case of manufacturing firms, suggesting that the process of organizational adaptation is highly context
dependent. In particular, financial slack seems to play different roles in manufacturing and service firms,
respectively.
2 Even if more detailed information is used to evaluate the outcome of a routine, there may
not be a transparent mapping between causes and effects, between rules in use and
observed outcomes. This situation may lead to superstitious learning (Rumelt, 1995).
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Micro and macro level processes of organizational adaptation
In their “Behavioral Theory of the Firm,” Cyert and March (1963) suggested that organizational choice
is routinized. Organizational adaptation was viewed as the process of choosing between different
routines, and the routines that are used most often are more likely to be employed again in the future
(Cyert and March, 1963: 99-100). A key problem is to specify a mechanism that selects one routine
over another and thereby controls the extent to which routines are changed or remain stable. In formal
organizations, a central mechanism is managerial intervention. Top managers have power to alter the
behavior of other organizational members through directives, sanctions and rewards. If the outcome of
a given routine is perceived to be successful by the top manager the likelihood that the routine is
repeated increases.
Managers usually do not draw inferences about the success of routines by mere observation of their
execution. Rather, they make their inferences by observing outcomes of routines and correlating
outcomes with execution. For example, managers regularly observe the financial performance of the firm
and make inferences about the degree of success2. Past performance contains information that is
relevant to making decisions about future organizational commitments (Lant and Hurley, 1999). Such
behavior can produce a bias towards incremental adaptation, as the expected returns from exploiting
existing skills are larger and less risky than the expected returns from exploring new opportunities
(March, 1991). Learning often requires simplification of complex problems in order to generate
sufficiently informative data from limited sample points (Levinthal and March, 1993). With repeated
7successes, organizational routines are likely to become increasingly formalized over time, and successful
small sample experiments tend to result in myopia and path dependence. To summarize the previous
arguments, we suggest a model of myopic adaptation that is illustrated in figure 1 below.  Figure 1
illustrates a two period example. We assume that the process is recurrent.
— — — — — — — —
Insert figure 1 about here
— — — — — — — —
Organizational Performance and Managerial Aspirations
A key criterion by which business firms are evaluated by internal and external stakeholders is their
financial performance. In Western culture, financially successful firms and their managers often gain
considerable status in society. One needs only to consult periodicals such as Business Week or Fortune
Magazine to get an impression of the honors that are bestowed upon managers of financially prosperous
firms. Financial success is often attributed to the personal skills and values of managers. For example,
a number of relationships between organizational structure and policy and the socio-demographic
characteristics of managers have been suggested in the literature (Miller, Kets de Vries, and Toulouse
(1982), Miller and Toulouse (1986)). 
When people observe outcomes of the organizational actions they are involved in, one consequence is
that they atrribute success to own skills and failure to external forces (Bernstein, Stephan, and Davis,
3 Although a person’s locus of control is generally assumed to be stable in the psychological
literature (Antonides, 1996: 33), the attribution process referred to above tends to reinforce
beliefs about an internal locus of control when success is observed and conversely when
failure is observed.
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1979; Ross and Sicoly, 1979). Self-serving bias in the attribution process is likely to result in managers
attributing their own skills and influence to the financial success of the firm. Moreover, as organizational
incentive systems often provide substantial career and financial rewards to managers of financially
successful firms, individual psychological biases are likely to be reinforced by the social context (March,
1994a, 1994b).
Managers experiencing success will tend to increase behaviors that increase their influence on decision
making in the organization. Financial performance provides a feedback about the performance of the
manager, and thus an indication of the appropriateness of the manager’s dispositions. 
Clearly, there are possibilities for false inferences about the true causal relationship underlying the
organization’s performance. We believe that the effect is the same: Observed financial performance
reinforces the manager’s beliefs about his own ability to control the situation. Thus, we predict that
managers experiencing success will tend to shift towards behaviors that are more likely to indicate an
internal locus of control than an external locus of control, when they receive positive feed-back in the
form of good results. Managers that have an internal locus of control tend to believe that they have
control over their environment, rather than being convinced that their performance is contingent upon
events and people beyond their control (Rotter, 1966)3.
To sum up, we propose that managers of financially successful firms will increase their aspirations
4 Please refer to appendix A for a detailed description of the variables employed in this study.
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concerning their own ability to control the fate of the firm. Therefore, they will modify their behavior
towards greater influence in organizational decision making by increasing the degree of involvement in
collecting and interpreting information used in organizational decision making and controlling the
implementation of decisions. We refer to this behavior as managerial control4.
H.1 Past financial performance is positively related to managerial control.
We do need to add a modification to our hypothesis, namely, firms that face highly unusual situations
are likely to exhibit non-routine response. Therefore, we only expect the hypothesis to hold for firms in
fairly routine circumstances. In non-routine circumstances such as extremely low or extremely high
financial performance, we predict that firms initiate search for alternative solutions or increase slack. In
the case of very low financial performance, search is initiated because of realized performance below
target levels, and in the case of very high performance, the organization may initiate slack search or for
that matter enjoy the benefits of the quiet life that comes with wealth (Cyert and March, 1963; March,
1994a). Alternatively, unsatisfactory performance may lead to escalation of commitment (Staw, 1981).
Many models are possible, but in routine situations a model of trial and error learning is most likely to
apply.
Managerial Aspirations and Organizational Rule Orientation
As managers attempt to increase their influence in organizational decision making processes, they need
to adapt the means for actually achieving control. Managers will therefore seek to adopt organizational
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structures that increase their ability to exert control over organizational members. Organizational rule
orientation may be viewed as a means to achieve control over the behavior of subordinates in the
organization (Deutsch, 1952; Scott, 1992). Thereby rule orientation is conceptually separated from
managerial control, which we view as an expression of managerial aspirations. 
By increasing rule orientation, the top manager can increase his power in the organization by controlling
strategically important information and resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Rule orientation provides
increased reliability in routine situations as coordination becomes more efficient, but is less effective in
non-routine situations that are characterized by high complexity and ambiguity (Blau and Scott, 1962:
116-128). Thus, we predict that organizational efficiency increases with rule orientation in routine
situations. 
We view rule orientation as the attempt to implement rules of behavior in the organization, and to
enforce these through organizational control systems. Increased rule orientation reduces the information
load on the manager. Rules and control systems substitute for detailed insight into the tasks and
behaviors of subordinates. The information processing load on the top manager therefore decreases with
increases in rule orientation (Scott, 1992: 234-244).
H.2 Increased managerial control  is positively related to rule orientation.
When the top manager’s information processing capacity is limited, it may be impossible to personally
observe whether subordinates actually carry out the proper procedures. Clearly this creates a gap
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between aspirations and implementation. In order to reduce the gap, the top manager can complement
detailed supervision of rule following with the use of explicit goals. Using explicit goals for the
organization’s middle managers provides a standard against which performance is evaluated, and eases
the evaluation of the degree of compliance with organizational routines. Moreover, perceived negative
discrepancies between actions and goals create motivational inducements for change. As stated by
Bandura (1977:161): “The motivational effects do not derive from the goals themselves, but rather from
the fact that people respond evaluatively to their own behavior.” Therefore rule orientation is positively
associated with organizational  goal orientation. We think of goal orientation as the extent to which there
are formal goals for organizational members, and the extent to which these are met.
H.3 Increased rule orientation is positively related to goal orientation.
Organizational Reliability and Efficiency
Increased formalization of work through rule and goal orientation tends to increase the reliability and
efficiency of organizations for at least two reasons. First, the ability to transmit relatively standardized
information increases, thereby improving the efficiency of coordination activities (Galbraith, 1973; Blau
and Scott, 1962). Secondly, increased rule orientation complemented by increased goal orientation
increases the top manager’s control over the organization. Both provide increased efficiency as long as
the organization does not encounter a non-routine situation. In routine situations goals have substantive
meaning, as the discrepancy between the actual and the perceived situation is small. Goal induced
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motivational discrepancies increase organizational efficiency (cf. Bandura, 1977).
H4: Organizational goal orientation is positively related to financial performance.
As past success increases organizational inertia due to positive reinforcement (Miller and Chen, 1994),
increased rule orientation and goal orientation favor an exploitation strategy over exploration (March,
1991). Organizational efficiency in routine situations is therefore increased indirectly by rule orientation
which works through increased organizational goal orientation.
Control Variables 
Organizational formalization is often thought to be causally related to size. In general, empirical research
has found a positive relationship between size and formalization (Burton and Obel, 1998; Miller, 1987).
We therefore control for the influence of organizational size. Similarly, it has been conjectured that
formalization increases with organizational age. Population level studies support the notion that
organizational inertia increases with age and size, and one of the key mechanisms that are related to age
and size is the development of bureaucratic structures (Hannan and Freeman, 1984, 1989; Miller and
Chen, 1994). We also control for possible effects of organizational age.
We have chosen to control for age and size at the end of the causal chain namely as paths to goal
orientation. We can improve model fit by also controlling for paths to rule orientation and managerial
control, but this comes at the expense of model parsimony. We did perform such alternative analyses,
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and the parameter estimates of the hypothesized paths did not change qualitatively or quantitatively.
These analyses are available from the first author.
In strategy research, the resource-based view of the firm argues that firm-specific resources influence
the firm’s performance (Barney, 1991). In order to avoid generating biased estimates of performance
effects, we control for unobservable effects on financial performance (Jacobson, 1990: 76). We control
for such firm-specific strategy factors by including a control for the direct influence of past performance
on current performance.
Towards an Empirical Model
The four hypotheses reflect a model of cumulative causation where adaptation of managerial aspirations
in response to changes in performance determine the extent of organizational rule and goal orientation.
Organizational rule and goal orientation are related to financial performance through the latter. Note that
we distinguish between routine and non-routine situations, and that the hypotheses only hold for routine
situations. Non-routineness indicates a boundary condition for the hypotheses. Evaluating the four
hypotheses collectively points towards a much more important organizational problem, namely the
dynamics of organizational routine change, and thereby towards the sources of organizational inertia.
The top manager of the firm therefore functions as the perceptual filter that attributes causes to the firm’s
level of financial performance, and also determines the extent of changes to the organizational structure
and strategy (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick and Brandon, 1988).
Clearly, the reasoning presented herein supports a conception of the world as one filled with myopic
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actors that learn from experience rather that attempting to apply some measure of foresight. Our line of
reasoning therefore builds upon the tradition established by the Carnegie School of Research. The
arguments assume a form of retrospective rationality which is in stark contrast to the rational agents,
populating theories of economics and rational theories of management.
We analyze the hypotheses using path analysis and use the structural equation modelling program
AMOS 4.0 to obtain a simultaneous estimate of the effects (Arbuckle and Wothke, 1999). We employ
controls for the influence of past financial performance on current financial performance, and age and
size influences on goal orientation in order to avoid biased estimates of the three effects that provide an
indirect link between past and current financial performance through path H1 6 H2 6 H3 6 H4. The
empirical model and hypotheses are presented in figure 2. We will test the hypothesized model on two
different samples of firms. We describe the samples in the next section. 
— — — — — — — —
Insert figure 2 about here
— — — — — — — —
Our key empirical and theoretical contribution is to test a process model that links financial performance
to organizational structure through managerial behavior.  In order to accept the proposed model, two
conditions must be fulfilled. First, all of our hypotheses concerning the particular paths need to be
accepted. Secondly, our model must fit the data satisfactorily.
5 We used the firm’s official industry classification as the criterion for categorizing a firm as
either a manufacturing or service firm. The classification system used is the standard NACE
system established by the European Union.
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Data and Analysis
The sample was drawn from two surveys of 124 medium-sized service firms and 135 manufacturing
firms. Both surveys were conducted as combined telephone and mail surveys in the spring of 1997. The
two samples were selected from the same geographical location, firm size, and legal organization. The
sample consisted of all firms within the sampled geographical area  (three different counties in
Denmark) which had between 50 and 499 employees according to officially registered information, and
were organized as limited liability firms. The latter allowed us to obtain the publicly available, and audited
financial statements.
Based on the firm’s main activity, we identified 273 manufacturing firms and 160 service firms within
the sampling criteria5. We received answers from 135 manufacturing firms and 124 service firms. The
sample was representative as there were no significant differences on the dimensions of size, age and
profitability between respondents and non-respondents. The overall response frequency for the total
sample was 59.8%. We consider the response rate sufficiently high to be able to generalize to the
sample of firms included, and venture that our conclusions also hold for the population of Danish
medium-sized firms. Table 1 below shows the response rates for both samples.
— — — — — — — —
Insert table 1 about here
— — — — — — — —
6 As a note to the interested but sceptical reader: Analyzing our two samples separately
yields identical results for the factor solution.
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The survey was carried out as a combined mail and telephone survey during March and April 1997. The
target respondent was the CEO of the firm. All participants were promised full confidentiality, but the
identities of the participating firms are known to the researchers. The fact that we know the identity of
the participating firms allows us to obtain audited publicly available accounting data for the participating
firms.
For the variables managerial control, rule orientation, and goal orientation, the respondents were asked
to rate the extent to which they agreed with a series of statements on 5 point Likert scales. The variable
managerial control is measured as an additive scale comprised of 3 Likert scaled items with a
Chronbach’s á = 0.715. We view management control as the extent to which the top manager of the
organization seeks to influence the decision processes in the organization by participating in the collection
and interpretation of information, and by controlling the implementation of decisions. The variable rule
orientation is measured as an additive scale comprised of 3 Likert-scaled items with a Chronbach’s
á = 0.881. We view rule orientation as the attempt to implement rules of behavior in the organization,
and to enforce these through organizational control systems. The variable goal orientation is measured
as an additive scale comprised of 2 Likert-scaled items with a Chronbach’s á =0.733.
To assess the discriminant validity of our constructs, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis using
maximum likelihood estimation6. We report the results of the factor analysis in table 2 below.
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— — — — — — — —
Insert table 2 about here
— — — — — — — —
The results of the factor analysis indicate that a 3-factor solution provides an adequate representation
of the data, whereas a two-factor solution is not adequate. The loadings and reliabilities indicate that our
constructs exhibit convergent and discriminant validity. The values of Chronbach’s á above 0.7 for the
three additive scales indicate sufficient scale reliability. The description of the three variables appears
in appendix A.
Financial data were obtained from the electronic database, CD-Direct, which is published by
Købmandstandens Oplysningsbureau, a Danish purveyor of credit information about businesses. The
database contains the publicly available financial statements. We used one measure of financial
performance, return on assets for 1996 and 1997, where income is measured before tax but after
interest payments and depreciation. 
We measure organizational size as the number of employees in the firm, and the organization’s age as
the number of years passed since the legal founding of the firm (2000-founding year). We use the
logarithm of these numbers to reduce problems with skewness in the size and age distribution of firms.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for the whole sample. Note that the average
financial performance increases slightly from 1996 to 1997. This probably reflects a prosperous business
18
cycle in the Danish economy.
— — — — — — — —
Insert table 3 about here
— — — — — — — —
As a key assumption underlying structural equation modelling is that the data is distributed according
to a multivariate normal distribution, we also conducted analyses to assess the degree of non-normality
in the data. Table 4 clearly shows that there are severe departures from normality in the data due
primarily to the financial data. Based on this analysis, we eliminated 10 observations from the dataset,
reducing the number of manufacturing firms to 119 and the number of service firms to 107. The criterion
for elimination was Mahalanobi’s D. The lower part of table 4 shows that after elimination of outliers
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the data are distributed according to a multivariate normal
distribution.
— — — — — — — —
Insert table 4 about here
— — — — — — — —
The analysis proceeds as follows. We first estimate the hypothesized model using path analysis. For the
samples including all observations, we estimate the model for each sample considered separately. We
repeat these analyses for the samples excluding outliers. For each model we evaluate model fit and
7 For example, NFI = ÷2(I) - ÷
2
(e) /÷
2
(I), where the subscript I indicates the independence model,
and the subscript e indicates the estimated model.
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regression coefficients. The results of these analyses are reported in tables 5 and 6. Model 1 is the
model analyzing manufacturing firms only. Model 2 is the model analyzing service firms. Models with
* indicate that outliers have been eliminated.
— — — — — — — —
Insert table 5 about here
— — — — — — — —
In table 5 we can see that absolute model fit improves as outliers are eliminated. The ÷2 value goes down
considerably for all estimations. Based on the values of ÷2, Model 2 and model 2* provide the best fit
of the data. All of the relative fit indices indicate good model fit compared to the independence model,
and the differences between the various estimated models are negligible. The reported fit indices (NFI,
RFI, IFI, TLI, CFI) compare the model fit of the estimated model with the model fit for the
independence model7. If the fit of the estimated model is close to the independence model, the value of
the fit index will approach 0, and conversely a good fit is indicated if the index is close to 1. It should
be noted that model 2* consistently outperforms all other models.
The RMSEA value of 0 found in model 2* indicates a perfect fit (Browne and Cudeck, 1993). We also
report the 90% confidence intervals for RMSEA. Neither model 1 or model 2* fit the data adequately.
The PCLOSE statistic further supports this conclusion. Finally, the values for Hoelther’s index indicate
that only model 2* achieves a satisfactory fit. Hoelther’s index indicates the largest sample size for which
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the model can be accepted (Hoelther, 1983).
The various fit indices reported suggest that only model 2 and 2* fit the data adequately. The
interpretation is clear: We must reject our hypotheses for the manufacturing firms, while we cannot reject
the hypotheses for the service firms based on evaluation of model fit.
In table 6, regression weights are reported along with standard errors and critical ratios (c.r. =
estimate/standard error). Again, results are reported for three models. In the discussion, we will restrict
the attention to the models excluding outliers, as non-normality seems to influence some of the parameter
estimates slightly.
— — — — — — — —
Insert table 6 about here
— — — — — — — —
We fail to reject hypothesis 1 for service firms (model 2*). However, hypothesis 1 is firmly rejected for
manufacturing firms. In fact, the relationship is more significant in the opposite direction than predicted
— and about the same magnitude as the relationship for service firms (p<.01). The result that higher
financial performance is negatively related to managerial control in the case of manufacturing firms may
indicate that managers in manufacturing firms increase slack search rather than their degree of control
over the organization through increased rule and goal orientation.
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We fail to reject hypothesis 2 for both samples. In fact the relationship between managerial control
and rule orientation is robust across all the six models (p<.01 and better). In conjunction with the
results for hypothesis 1, these results suggest that regardless of the source of their beliefs, if managers
are oriented towards an internal locus of control, they will tend towards creating a more formalized
organization.
We reject hypothesis 3 for the manufacturing firms, while we fail to reject the hypothesis for the service
firms. The goal orientation is increased as a response to rule orientation in service firms, whereas goal
orientation is not significantly related to rule orientation in manufacturing firms.
Similarly, we reject hypothesis 4 for the manufacturing firms, while we fail to reject the hypothesis for
the service firms. Apparently, goal orientation is not associated with financial performance in the case
of manufacturing firms, whereas there is a significant effect in the case of service firms.
Neither size or organizational age seems to have an influence on organizational goal orientation, whereas
the influence of past financial performance on current financial performance is highly significant.
Overall, comparisons of parameter estimates for manufacturing firms and service firms seem to indicate
that there are important contextual differences between manufacturing and service. These may be caused
by differences in organizational technology (cf. Perrow, 1967) or environments (cf. Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967). We attach the greatest theoretical and practical significance to the differences between
the parameter estimates relating past financial performance to managerial control. Overall, technological
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opportunity is likely to be different for manufacturing and service firms, respectively. Manufacturing firms
are likely to have greater opportunities for product and process innovation compared to service firms.
The latter are often judged by their ability to deliver a timely and reliable service to customers, and
formalization and routinization are more likely to improve organizational efficiency since these favor an
exploitation strategy. Manufacturing firms, on the other hand, can often gain considerable competitive
advantages by introducing new products as these can be protected by patents and similar isolation
mechanisms (Rumelt, 1984). Therefore, increased financial slack may lead to a greater emphasis on
exploration strategies in manufacturing firms compared to service firms.
We find support for our main theoretical proposition in the case of service firms: Managerial aspirations
are changed in response to experiental learning, and changes in aspirations lead to changes in
organizational formalization. Interestingly, after elimination of outliers that exhibit what can only be
described as unusually high or low financial performance, we obtained better model fit. The firms we
eliminated can all be placed in non-routine circumstances, thus supporting our reservations concerning
our predictions. In non-routine situations, behavioral patterns are most likely changed by initiating search
for new solutions as aspirations fail to meet expectations (Cyert and March, 1963).
The results concerning the manufacturing firms are somewhat different. These results indicate that
managers of manufacturing firms respond differently to financial slack. Rather than strengthening their
control over the organization, they tended to reduce it. A probable reason is that financial slack
generates slack search in manufacturing, and thereby leads the firm towards an exploration strategy
rather than an exploitation strategy.
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Discussion and Conclusion
We have analyzed organizational adaptation from a dynamic process perspective, linking managerial
behavior, organizational structure, and performance. We have emphasized incremental adaptation in
routine situations in the study, and provided an indirect link between the environment and the
organization. Decisions about organizational formalization through rule and goal orientation is shaped
by the top manager’s perceptual filtering. Changes in the top manager’s aspirations and behavior happen
in response to experiental learning, and lead to changes in organizational formalization. Thus, we have
described a process of organizational adaptation that links micro level and macro level selection
processes, and provided a more credible account of the process of changing organizational routines.
We hypothesized that past financial performance was positively related to managerial control (H1).
Given the self-serving bias of attributing success to internal forces (Bernstein, Stephan, and Davis, 1979;
Ross and Sicoly, 1979), increased financial performance was believed to raise managerial aspiration
levels. The empirical results provided support for the hypothesized positive relationship in service firms.
Managers of service firms tended to attribute financial performance to their own behaviors, and
subsequently increase behaviors that increased their influence on organizational decision making
processes. The hypothesis was rejected for manufacturing firms, and the relationship was significant with
a negative parameter. Apparently, the substantive meaning of the information contained in performance
data is context-specific. Therefore more complex managerial and organizational responses may result
(Lant and Hurley, 1999). This may indicate that the presence of financial slack relaxes control and
coordination pressures, and probably leads to slack search in manufacturing firms.
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The idea that the top manager’s personality and behavior is related to organizational performance is not
new, and has been studied extensively. Of particular relevance for this study is the work of Danny Miller
and associates. For example, Miller, Kets de Vries, and Toulouse (1982) considered the personality
dimension locus of control and found that more internal chief executives tended to lead rather than follow
competitors, to undertake greater risks, and pursue more innovative strategies. Miller and Toulouse
(1986) found that the personality dimension internal locus of control was associated with the pursuit of
innovative strategies, and generally future oriented strategies, given their perception of control over the
environment. They also found that flexibility was associated with high risk taking in decision making, and
that informal organizational designs and need for achievement were related to formal structures and
proactive decision making. Miller and Dröge (1986) examined the relationship between chief executive
need for achievement and its effects on organizational centralization, formalization, and complexity. Their
results showed that the more achievement-oriented the CEO, the more power was centralized, and the
more formalization and functional specialization were preferred.
In contrast, our study illuminates a chain of causality by which managerial intervention is effectuated.
Moreover, consideration of psychological attribution processes allows us to describe a process of
organizational adaptation rather than simply capturing the effect of unique personality traits.
We further hypothesized that when managerial influence in decision making processes increases, the
means for achieving control over others’ behavior also increases (H2 and H3). We failed to reject both
hypotheses for service firms, but rejected hypothesis three for manufacturing firms. This indicates that
regardless of the source of their beliefs, if oriented towards internal locus of control, managers will create
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formalized organizations.
Finally, we hypothesized goal orientation to be related to financial performance (H4). This hypothesis
was rejected for manufacturing firms whereas a significant effect was found for service firms. The
relationship between goal orientation and performance can be explained by the efficiency achieved by
the organization as coordination activities are improved (Galbraith, 1973). Such efficient coordination
favors exploitation strategies (March, 1991).
Formalization has often been shown to increase with age and size, either as a result of the development
of bureaucratic structures (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) or inertia (Miller and Chen, 1994). Although
model fit was improved when controlling for age and size, these variables were not significantly related
to any other variable, and the hypothesized paths did not change. Naturally, when controlling for the
influence of past performance on current performance the relationship was found highly significant. When
we excluded the path from past performance to current performance, the relationship between goal
orientation and current performance became non-significant — all other relationships were stable. These
estimates are not shown but are available from the first author by request.
It should not be forgotten that our empirical data only cover a relatively short time span. Therefore, the
organizational adaptation we capture is decidedly myopic. The results are not likely to reflect major
investment initiatives or changes in strategic direction. These are more likely to enter as noise in the
sample. Since outliers exhibiting unusual financial performance were excluded from the analysis, the
empirical results are only likely to hold in routine situations. In extreme financial situations we expect to
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see greater emphasis on search which we did not include in our research (Cyert and March, 1963;
March 1994a). Future research should utilize designs that can discriminate between routine and non-
routine situations.
The firms were sampled in early 1997 and our accounting data spans both 1996 and 1997. This period
was characterized by a growing and prosperous business environment in Denmark. Economic growth,
interest rates, unemployment and other macroeconomic indicators were all improving. Manufacturing
and service firms operating mainly in the home market were not likely to encounter situations requiring
major shifts in strategy or structure. Thus we cannot generalize our results concerning financial
performance beyond an economic environment charaterized by progress. Given the opportunity to
replicate our study during an economic downturn, we predict different empirical results. At least for
some firms, a high degree of formalization is likely to hinder adaptation, and many firms are likely to
substitute exploitation strategies for exploration strategies.
The overall lesson learned from this study concerns the process of changing organizational routines. The
empirical results show that the top manager performed a critical link between information about
organizational performance and organizational action. Moreover, the differences we found between
manufacturing and service firms indicate that financial slack influences managerial perceptions and
subsequent organizational actions in a more complex way than we suggested.
We have portraied managers as myopic actors learning from experience rather than attempting to use
foresight, for example by initiating organizational search activities. In the absence of an explicit
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consideration of organizational search, we cannot conclude that managers are as myopic as suggested
in this paper. Future research needs to take search processes explicitly into account — and distinguish
between systematic and unsystematic search (Simon, 1958).
Clearly more empirical research is needed. Our empirical research only covers a limited time frame, and
does not consider the influence of organizational search. In order to shed light on what happens in a
different economic environment, longer time series are needed. Unfortunately, the research methodology
we used in this paper is not suited for such research, so methods and data are needed for this task.
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Appendix A: Description of variables in the questionnaire.
Managerial control
The scale Managerial control was constructed from 3 items on a 5-point Likert scale. The respondents
were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with the statements made in this group of questions
on a 5-point Likert scale. The scale ranged from “Yes, always,” over “Yes, often,” “Some times,”
Rarely,” to “Never.”
“The CEO is involved in collecting the information that is used for decision making.”
“The CEO is involved in the interpretation of the information that is used for making
decisions.”
“The CEO personally controls that decisions are implemented.”
Rule orientation and goal orientation
The respondents were given a brief introduction to a group of questions concerning how middle
managers operate in the firm. The introduction included a definition of a middle manager:
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“Background and qualifications of middle managers
By a middle manager is meant a person who has the responsibility of a department or a
function and has at least one subordinate.”
The respondents were then asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with the statements made in
this group of questions on a 5-point Likert scale. The scale ranged from “totally agree” “somewhat
agree” “neither agree or disagree” “somewhat disagree” to “totally disagree.”
The scale Rule orientation is comprised of the following 5 items:
“There are explicit rules for how middle managers perform their duties”
“It is necessary to give detailed instructions to our middle managers about how to perform
their work.” 
“To a great extent, we control the degree to which middle managers follow the rules.”
The scale Goal orientation is comprised of the following 2 items:
“We often set goals for the middle managers”
“ To a great extent, we control whether the results of the middle managers achieve the
expected goals.”
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TABLES
Table 1. Response rates
Manufacturing Service Total
Expected population 273 160 433
Number of responses 135 124 259
Response rate 49.45% 77.50% 59.82%
Table 2. Rotated Factor Matrix
Factor
Goal
orientation
Rule
orientation
Managerial
control
There are explicit rules for how middle managers perform
their duties.
0.108 0.490 0.111
It is necessary to give detailed instructions to our middle
managers about how to perform their work
0.001 0.629 0.177
To a great extent, we control the the degree to which middle
managers follow the rules.
0.124 0.933 0.099
We often set goals for the middle managers. 0.985 0.031 0.025
To a great extent, we control whether the results of the
middle managers achieve the expectated goals.
0.787 0.186 0.083
The CEO is involved in collecting the information that is used
for decision making.
-0.082 0.128 0.645
The CEO is involved in the interpretation of the information
that is used for making decisions.
0.102 0.115 0.717
The CEO personally controls that decisions are implemented. 0.111 0.147 0.638
Chronbach’s Alpha 0.733 0.881 0.715
Percentage of variance accounted for 20.70% 19.96% 17.46%
Cumulative percentage 20.70% 40.66% 58.12%
Test of factor models ÷2 df p
2 factor model 123.995 13 <0.00001
3 factor model 9.654 7 .209
4 factor model 0.36 2 .835
N = 236
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std.dev Variance  Correlations
Return on
assets
1996
manageria
l control
lnage lnemploy rule
orientatio
n
goal
orientatio
n
Return on
assets
1997
Return on
assets
1996
0.072 0.114 0.013 1.000 0.078 0.033 0.181 -0.017 0.030 0.406
manageria
l control
8.492 2.024 4.097 1.000 -0.063 -0.176 0.292 0.138 0.179
lnage 2.928 0.626 0.392 1.000 0.115 -0.083 0.090 -0.001
lnemploy 4.647 0.673 0.453 1.000 -0.103 0.070 0.129
rule
orientatio
n
8.140 2.768 7.663 1.000 0.213 -0.003
goal
orientatio
n
7.682 2.058 4.234 1.000 0.132
Return on
assets
1997
0.078 0.161 0.026 1.000
N=236
Table 4. Tests for normality.
All observations included (N=236)
min max skew c.r. kurtosis c.r.
Return on
assets 1996
-0.562 0.346 -1.523 -9.554 7.066 22.158
managerial
control
3 12 -0.276 -1.73 -0.538 -1.688
lnage 1.609 4.86 0.063 0.396 -0.079 -0.247
lnemploy 3.912 7.048 0.984 6.169 0.417 1.306
rule
orientation
3 15 0.096 0.601 -0.729 -2.287
goal
orientation
2 10 -0.784 -4.914 0.047 0.146
Return on
assets 1997
-1.569 0.684 -4.392 -27.544 45.312 142.09
Multivariate  72.616 49.69
Outliers eliminated (N=226)
min max skew c.r. kurtosis c.r.
Return on
assets 1996
-0.176 0.346 0.327 2.004 0.49 1.503
managerial
control
4 12 -0.254 -1.558 -0.605 -1.856
lnage 1.609 4.86 0.025 0.151 0.047 0.144
lnemploy 3.912 6.477 0.797 4.893 -0.263 -0.808
rule
orientation
3 15 0.098 0.601 -0.747 -2.293
goal
orientation
2 10 -0.762 -4.676 0.025 0.077
Return on
assets 1997
-0.199 0.389 0.336 2.062 0.66 2.026
Multivariate  1.435 0.961
Table 5. Assessment of model fit.
All observations included Outliers eliminated
Fit Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 1* Model 2*
Discrepancy 30.206 13.182 23.604 10.027 CMIN
Degrees of freedom 13 13 13 13 DF
P 0.004 0.434 0.035 0.692 P
Number of parameters 22 22 22 22 NPAR
Discrepancy / df 2.324 1.014 1.816 0.771 CMIN/DF
Normed fit index 0.985 0.993 0.988 0.995 NFI
Relative fit index 0.968 0.984 0.974 0.989 RFI
Incremental fit index 0.991 1.000 0.995 1.002 IFI
Tucker-Lewis index 0.981 1.000 0.988 1.003 TLI
Comparative fit index 0.991 1.000 0.995 1.000 CFI
RMSEA 0.103 0.011 0.083 0.000 RMSEA
RMSEA lower bound 0.055 0.000 0.022 0.000 RMSEALO
RMSEA upper bound 0.151 0.096 0.136 0.076 RMSEAHI
P for test of close fit 0.037 0.671 0.145 0.854 PCLOSE
Hoelter .05 index 93 185 112 237 HFIVE
Hoelter .01 index 115 229 139 293 HONE
Table 6. Regression Weights ¶
All observations included Outliers eliminated
Model 2 Model 3 Model 2* Model 3*
managerial
control
<-- Return on assets
1996
-0.344 4.892* -5.414** 6.522**
1.341 2.081 1.828 2.353
-0.257 2.351 -2.962 2.772
rule orientation <-- managerial
control
0.356 0.439*** 0.340** 0.457***
0.118 0.122 0.126 0.126
3.015 3.612 2.698 3.629
goal orientation <-- rule orientation 0.124** 0.189** 0.118 0.178***
0.07 0.063 0.07 0.061
1.774 3 1.677 2.913
goal orientation <-- lnage 0.087 0.573* 0.018 0.528**
0.296 0.291 0.303 0.286
0.296 1.967 0.061 1.847
goal orientation <-- lnemploy 0.231 0.409 0.219 0.273
0.244 0.35 0.264 0.34
0.948 1.168 0.831 0.802
Return on assets
1997
<-- goal orientation 0 0.022** 0.001 0.007**
0.005 0.008 0.004 0.003
-0.047 2.614 0.141 2.166
Return on assets
1997
<-- Return on assets
1996
0.488*** 0.737*** 0.623*** 0.743***
0.073 0.176 0.096 0.077
6.64 4.187 6.512 9.683
Squared multiple correlations
managerial
control
0.001 0.048 0.069 0.068
rule orientation 0.068 0.107 0.058 0.110
goal orientation 0.032 0.120 0.029 0.109
Return on assets
1997
0.261 0.185 0.264 0.484
N 126 110 119 107
*p<.05. *' p<.01. ***p<.001
¶ The table first reports regression coefficients, then standard errors, and critical ratios. (Critical ratio =
Estimate/std. error.)
Financial
performance, t0
Financial
performance, t1
Adjustment of
managerial behavior
Adjustment of
organizational action
Figure 1The basic model of organizational adaptation
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control
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Figure 2The empirical model
